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Abstract 
We argue that the situation calculus is a natural formalism for representing and reasoning about 
control and strategic information. As a case study, in this paper we provide a situation calculus 
semantics for the Prolog cut operator, the central search control operator in Prolog. We show that 
our semantics is well-behaved when the programs are properly stratified, and that according to this 
semantics, the conventional implementation of the negation-as-failure operator using cut is provably 
correct with respect to the stable model semantics. 0 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. 
1. Introduction 
The situation calculus (McCarthy and Hayes [Sl) is a formalism for representing and 
reasoning about actions in dynamic domains. It is a many-sorted predicate calculus with 
some reserved predicate and function symbols. For example, in the blocks world to say 
that block A is initially clear, we write: 
H(clear(A), So), 
where H is a reserved binary predicate that stands for “holds”, and SO is a reserved constant 
symbol denoting the initial situation. As an another example, to say that action stuck(x, y) 
causes on(x, y) to be true, we write: * 
H(ofi(x, Y), ~~MWx, ~1, s)), 
’ E-mail: flin@cs.ust.hk. 
2 In this paper, free variables in a displayed formula are assumed to be universally quantified. 
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where the reserved function do(u, s) denotes the resulting situation of doing the action a 
in the situation s. This is an example of how the effects of an action can be represented in 
the situation calculus. Generally, in the situation calculus: 
l situations are first-order objects that can be quantified over; 
l a situation carries information about its history, i.e., the sequence of actions that have 
been performed so far. For example, the history of the situation 
do(stack(A. B), do(stuck(B, C), SO)) 
is [stuck(B, C), stuck(A, B)], i.e., the sequence of actions that have been performed 
in the initial situation to reach it. As we shall see later, our foundational axioms will 
enforce a one-to-one correspondence between situations and sequences of actions. 
We believe that these two features of the situation calculus make it a natural formalism for 
representing and reasoning about control knowledge. For example, in AI planning, a plan 
is a sequence of actions, thus isomorphic to situations. So control knowledge in planning, 
which often are constraints on desirable plans, becomes constraints on situations (Lin [6]). 
Similarly, when we talk about control information in logic programming, we are referring 
to constraints on derivations, i.e., sequences of actions according to (Lin and Reiter [7]). 
Although our long term goal is to develop a general framework for representing and 
reasoning about control knowledge in problem solving using the situation calculus, our 
focus in this paper is the Prolog cut operator, the central search control operator in Prolog. 
We shall provide a situation calculus semantics for logic programs with cut, and show 
that our semantics is well-behaved when the programs are properly stratified. We also 
show that according to this semantics, the conventional implementation of the negation-as- 
failure operator using cut is provably correct with respect to the stable model semantics of 
Gelfond and Lifschitz [3]. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time a connection 
has been shown between a declarative semantics of negation and that of cut. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the basic concepts in 
the situation calculus and logic programming. Section 3 reviews the situation calculus 
semantics of (Lin and Reiter [7]) for cut-free logic programs. For the purpose of this paper, 
the key property of this semantics is that derivations in logic programming are identified 
with situations. Section 4 extends this semantics to logic programs with cut. This is done by 
an axiom on accessible situations, that is, those situations whose corresponding derivations 
are not “cut off” by cut. Section 5 shows that our semantics is well-behaved for a class of 
stratified programs. Section 6 shows that the conventional implementation of negation-as- 
failure using cut is provably correct. Finally Section 7 concludes this paper. 
2. Logical preliminaries 
2.1. The situation calculus 
The language of the situation calculus is a many-sorted second-order one with equality. 
We assume the following sorts: situation for situations, action for actions, fluent for 
propositional fluents such as clear whose truth values depend on situations, and object 
for everything else. As we mentioned above, we assume that Se is a reserved constant 
E Lin / Art$cial lntelligenre IO3 ( 1998) 273-294 21s 
c do(la,b.cl,SO) d do([a,b,c,dl,SO) 
f 
a 
0 
SO do(a,SO) do(la,cl,SO) 
Fig. 1. A function f as required by the axiom (6). 
denoting the initial situation, H a reserved predicate for expressing properties about fluents 
in a situation, do a reserved binary function denoting the result of performing an action. In 
addition, we assume the following two partial orders on situations: 
l C: following convention, we write c in infix form. By s c s’ we mean that s’ can 
be obtained from s by a sequence of actions. As usual, s C s’ will be a shorthand for 
s c s’ v s = s’. 
l C: we also write c in infix form. By s c s’ we mean that s can be obtained from s’ 
by deleting some of its actions. Similarly, s C s’ stands for s c s’ v s = s’. 
We shall consider only the discrete situation calculus with the following foundational 
axioms: 
So #do@, s). (1) 
do(ul, sl) = do(a2, ~2) > (al = a2 A s1 = s2), (2) 
WP)[P(So) A (Vu, s>(P(s> > f’(do(a, s))) 3 (Vs)~C~)l, (3) 
7s c so, (4) 
s c do(a, s’) 3 s c s’, (5) 
s c s’ = s #s’ A (3f){(Vq 1 SZ>(Sl E $2 3 f@l) c f(s2)) A 
(‘da, sl>kW, sI) E s 3 do(a, .f@l>> C .y’)l. (6) 
The first two axioms are unique names assumptions for situations. The third axiom is 
second order induction. It amounts to the domain closure axiom that every situation has 
to be obtained from the initial one by repeatedly applying the function do. In other words, 
it says that every situation is either the initial situation So or the result of performing a 
sequence of actions in the initial situation, exactly the isomorphism between situations and 
sequences of actions that we mentioned earlier. As can be expected, induction will play an 
important role in this paper. 
Axioms (4) and (5) define C inductively. The partial order c is really the “prefix” 
relation: 3 Given a situation S = do([al , . . . , a,], SO), S’ & S iff there is a 0 < k < II such 
that 5” = do([al. . . . , ak], SO). In particular, we have (Vs)So E s. 
Axiom (6) defines C. Informally, s C s’ iff s can be obtained from s’ by deleting some 
of its actions. More precisely, suppose S’ = do([al , . . a,], So). Then S C S’ iff there 
3 Given a sequence of actions [al,. , a,], we use &([a~, a,], S) to denote the resulting situation of 
performing the sequence of actions in S. Inductively, &I([]. .s) = s and do([aJL], S) = d&L, &(a, s)). 
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are integers 1 < il < . < ik < n, 0 6 k < n, such that 5’ = dO([oi, , . . . , ai,], SO). Fig. 1 
illustrates a function f as required by axiom (6) for proving the following relation: 
Ma, cl, So) c doGa, 6, c. 4, So) 
Notice that c is a special case of C: if s c s’ then s c s’. As we shall see, the partial 
order c will play a crucial role in this paper. 
In the following, we shall denote by C the set of the above axioms (l)-(6). 
2.2. Logic programs 
We consider definite logic programs with cut. An atom p is a fluent term F(tl , . , tn), 
where F is a fluent of arity objectn, and tl , . . , t, are terms of sort object. A goal G is an 
expression of the form 
11 & ... & I, 
where n 3 0, and for each 1 < i < n, li is either an atom, an equality atom of the form 
t=t’,or !. 
Without loss of generality, we assume that a clause (rule) is an expression of the form 
F(xl,...,x,) :- G 
where F is a fluent of the arity objecf , x1 , . , x, are distinct variables of sort object, and 
G is a goal. Notice that the more common form of a clause 
F(tl,...,t,,) :- G. 
can be taken to be a shorthand for the following clause: 
F(xl,....x,) : - xl =tl & ... & xn =tn & G. 
wherext,..., xn are fresh variables not in G and tl . . , t, 
Finally, a (definite) program is a finite set of clauses. The dejinition of a fluent symbol 
F in a program P is the set of clauses in P that have F in their heads. 
Since a goal is not a situation calculus formulas, we need a way to refer to its truth 
values. Given a goal G = 11 & . . . & In, and a situation term S, we define H(G, S), the 
truth value of G in the situation S, to be the situation calculus formula 
H(ll,S)r\...r\ H(l,,S), 
where for each 1 < i 6 n: 
(1) If li is t = t’, then H (li , S) is li 
(2) If li is ! , then H (1,. S) is the tautology true. 
For example, H (x = a & parent(x, y) & ! , SO) is 
x = a A H @arent(x, y), SO) A true. 
3. A logical semantics 
The cut operator in Prolog plays two roles. As a goal, it succeeds immediately. As 
a search control operator, it prevents a Prolog interpreter from backtracking past it. 
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Consequently, our semantics for programs with cut will come in two stages. First, we 
consider the “pure logical” semantics of the programs when cut is taken to be a goal that 
succeeds immediately. For this purpose, we shall use the situation calculus semantics for 
logic programs without cut proposed by Lin and Reiter [7]. For our purpose here, the 
key of this semantics is that program clauses are identified with the effects of actions in 
the situation calculus, so a branch in a search tree becomes a sequence of actions, thus 
isomorphically, a situation. This is important because the effect of a cut on the search tree 
can then be modeled by restrictions on situations. So our second step in formalizing the 
cut operator is to define a relation call Act on situations so that Act(s) holds with respect 
to a logic program if the sequence of actions in s corresponds to a successful derivation 
according to the program. 
The rest of this section is basically a review of [7] with a minor notational difference: 
while we reify fluents and use the special predicate H, Lin and Reiter [7] treat fluents as 
predicate symbols. For example, H(broken, s) would be written as broken(s) in [7]. 
According to [7], clauses are treated as rules, so that the application of such a rule in the 
process of answering a query is like performing an action. Formally, given a clause of the 
form 
F(xl,...,x,) :- G. 
Lin and Reiter [7] introduce a unique action A of the arity &jecP + action to name this 
clause. The only effect of this action is the following: 
($)H(G, s) 3 H(F(x’), MA(i), s)), 
where x’ is (xl, . . . , x,), and < is the tuple of variables that are in G but not in 2. For 
example, suppose gp(x. y) is the action that names the following clause: 
gparent(x,y) :- parent(x,z) & parent(z,y) 
then we have the following effect axiom: 
(%)]H@arerzt(x, z), s) A H@arent(z, y), s)l > H(gparent(n, y), do(gp(x, y), s)). 
Now suppose that P is a program and F a fluent. Suppose the definition of F in P is 
A,(;): F(x) :- Cl 
Ak(x) : F(x) : - Gk 
where A 1, . . , Ak are the action names for the corresponding clauses. Then we have the 
following corresponding effect axioms for the fluent F: 
(YflV;)ff(G~> $1 1 H(FGh do(A~(;), s)), 
@$)H(Gk. s> 3 H(F(i), do(Ak(i), s)), 
where yi, 1 < i < k, is the tuple of variables in Gi which are not in x’. We then generate 
the following successor state axiom (Reiter [IO]) for F: 
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H(F(;),do(a,s))= (a=Al(~)~(3y;)H(G,,s) v...v 
(a = Ak(i) A @.Y;oH(Gk, s)) v H(F(i), s)l. (7) 
Intuitively, this axiom says that F is true in a successor situation iff either it is true initially 
or the action is one that corresponds to a clause in the definition of F and the body of the 
clause is satisfied initially. In particular, if the definition of F in the program P is empty, 
then (7) becomes H(F(Z), do(a, s)) = H(F(x), s). 
In the following, we call (7) the successor state axiom for F with respect to to P. 
Given a logic program P, the set of successor state axioms with respect to P, together 
with some domain independent axioms, is then the “pure logical meaning” of P: 
Definition 1. The basic action theory V for P is 
2) = c u Dss u 2),,, u 2)s0 
where 
l C is the set of foundational axioms given in Section 2.1. 
l DD,, is the set of successor state axioms for the fluents according to P. 
l Vu*, is the following set of unique names axioms: 
f(2) # g(3 (8) 
for every pair f, g of distinct function symbols, and 
,f(x) = f(_?, 3 x = _; (9) 
for every function symbol ,f. Notice that D,,, includes unique names axioms for 
actions. 
0 Vs,, is: 
(H(F(.?), So) -false 1 F is a fluent]. 
Definition 2. Let P be a program, and ‘D its corresponding basic action theory. A situation 
term S is called a plan for a goal G iff V /= (V,?)H(G, S), where x’ are the variables in 
G and S. 
Given a query G, we then look for a tuple of terms z and a plan S for G (ii. Deductively, 
this amounts to find a constructive proof of the entailment: V + (%, s)H(G, s), where 
x’ are the variables in G. Therefore query answering in logic programs literally becomes 
planning in the style of (Green [4]) in the situation calculus. This semantics has some nice 
properties. For example, it generalizes the Clark completion semantics: 
Theorem 1 (Lin and Reiter [7]). Let P be a program, V its action theory, and F afluent. 
Suppose the successor state axiom for F in 2) is (7), and Gi is li 1 & . . & liki for 1 < i < n. 
Then V entails the Clark completion for F: 
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This semantics is also closely related to a recent proposal by Wallace [ 121, and in the 
propositional case, equivalent to Gelfond and Lifschitz’s stable model semantics [3]. For 
details, see (Lin and Reiter [7]). 
Example 1. Consider the following program for max(x. y. z), ; is the maximum of 
{X. y]: 4 
A~(x,y.z): max(x,y,z) :- leq(x,y) & ! SC z=y 
A2(x, y. z) : max(x,y,z) :- 2=x 
RI 6, J) : leq(x,y) :- x=1 & y=2 
B2(X, y): leq(x,y) :- x=1 & y=l 
&(x, .Y): leq(x,y) :- x=2 & y=2. 
Here leq(x, y) means that x is less than or equal to y, and 1 and 2 are constants. We have 
the following successor state axioms for max and leq: 
H(mux(x, y, z), d&z, s)) = 
u = Al(x, y, z) A H(leq(x, y), s) A z = y v 
(u = A2(x, y. z) A z =x> v H(mux(x, J, z), s), 
H(leq(x, y), &(a, s)) E 
{u=Bl(x,y)Ax=lAy=2v 
u=B~(x,y)Ax=lny=lv 
(u = B3(X, y) AX = 2 A y = 2) v H(/eq(x. y), s)]. 
From these successor state axioms, it is easy to see that performing first Bt (1,2), then 
A1 (I, 2,2) in SO will result in a situation satisfying m&l, 2,2). Thus we have the 
following desirable conclusion: 
D + (3s)H(mux( 1,2,2). s). 
On the other hand, it is also clear that the action Az(x, y, X) will make mux(x, y, X) true, 
so we also have: 
2) I= (Vx, y)(3s)ff(ma-4x, .Y, xl. s), 
which is not so desirable. Of course, the reason is that the basic action theory D does 
not take into account the effects of ! on the search space. According to Prolog’s search 
strategy, which attempts rules in the order as they are given, the second rule (AZ) for mux 
will not be attempted if the subgoal leq(x, y) before ! in the first rule for max succeeds. 
Therefore the derivation corresponding to &~(Az(x, y, x), So) will not be considered if 
there is a derivation for leq(x, y), which is the case here if x = 1 and y = 2. 
4 Thk is a typical example of improper uses of cut. We’ll return to this point later 
280 E Lin /Art$cial Intelligence 103 (1998) 273-294 
Let us call a situation accessible if the derivation corresponding to this situation5 is 
legal, i.e., not ruled out by the cut. Our goal in defining a semantics for the cut operator is 
then to characterize the set of accessible situations. This is what we are going to do in the 
next section. 
4. A semantics for cut 
A clause containing cut: 
cut(x’) : F(2) : - Gt & ! & G2 
means that if G 1 succeeds, then any derivation of F(.?) must use either 
(1) a rule before this one; or 
(2) this rule with the first derivation of G 1. 
We now proceed to formalize this informal reading. 
First, notice that we need two ordering relations: one on rules for deciding the 
precedence of rules, and the other on situations for defining “the first derivation”. 
In the following, we shall assume that we are given an ordering x on actions (rules), and 
will define an ordering on situations using <. Intuitively, if o < #3, then during the process 
of search, the action a will be considered before the action j3. For instance, according to 
Prolog’s ordering rule, for our max example, (Vi!, ;)A, (2) -x AZ(;). 
Given a partial order on actions, there are many ways situations, i.e., sequences of 
actions, can be ordered, depending on particular problem solving strategies. In Prolog, 
a query is answered using a goal-directed search strategy, so if a plan do([ot , . . , a,], So) 
is returned, then it must be the case that a,, is first decided, then on_ 1, . , and finally a! 1. 
If we read s 4 s’ as that the sequence of actions in s is considered before that in s’, then 
we have the following definition: 
Definition 3. Given a partial order < on actions, the derived partial order with the same 
name < on situations is defined by the following axiom: 
s < s’ E @a, 6, SI, s2)(s = do@, SI) A s’ = do(b, ~2) A 
[a 4 b v (a = b A sl < s2)]). (10) 
With this partial order on situations, we can then say, roughly, that a situation is a “first 
derivation” of a goal G if it is a derivation of G that is minimal according to +. However, 
to make this precise we first need a space of derivations to define the notion of minimality. 
We do not want it to be the set of all plans for G because according to our definition, if 
2) is a basic action theory for a logic program, then 
D /= (Vu, s).H(G, S) > H(G, do@, s)). 
So if s is a plan for G, then for any action a, &(a, S) is also a plan for G. This means 
that a plan for G can always be made “smaller” according to + by appending to it some 
irrelevant actions. To avoid this problem, we define the notion of minimal plans: 
’ In the following, the terms situations and derivations will be used interchangeably. 
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Definition 4. For any situation term S, any goal G, we denote by minimal(G, S) the 
following formula: 
H(G, S) A -(E!s)[s c S A H(G, s)]. 
Intuitively, minimal(G, S) holds if no actions in it can be deleted for it continue to be 
a plan of G. For our mux program in Section 3. it is easy to see that 
D~minimal(leq(l,2),do(Br(1,2),Su)). 
But 
2) ~minimal(leq(l,2),do([B1(1,2), A1(1,2,2)1,So)). 
because &I( Bt ( 1,2), So) c do( [ B1 (1,2), A I ( 1,2,2)], So). It can be seen that for any goal 
G, if there is a plan for it, then there is a minimal plan for it: 
C + (Vs).H(G, s) > (3s’)(s’ C s r\minimal(G, s’)). 
We are now ready to formalize the informal reading of a clause containing ! at the 
beginning of this section. For this purpose, we introduce a new predicate Act(s), meaning 
that s is not “cut off” by cut. 
If a program contains the cut rule cut ($, and the goal G 1 succeeds, then for Act(s) to 
hold, it must be the case that for every minimal plan st of F in s, either it uses a rule before 
this cut rule or it uses this cut rule with the first derivation of G 1: 
Act(s) > (V~){(3s')[Acc(s') A ($)H(G,, s’)] > 
(Vsl)[sl csr\minimal(F(_?),sl)> 
(3a,s2)(q =do(a,s2)Aa -c cut(.?))v (II) 
(3s2. SS)(Sl = do(cut(xt), s2) A 
sj C s2 A first-der(Gl,ss))]], 
where < is the tupleofthe freevariables that are in Gt but not in.?, and f irst-der(Gt , sg) 
stands for the following formula: 
@$)minimal(Gt, ~3) A -($)[s; < sg r\Acc(s$) A @)minimal(Gl, si)], 
where < is the tuple of variables that are in Gr but not in x’. We remark that in the axiom 
(11): 
l The formula 
@s’)(Acc(s’) A (%)H(Gt, s’)) 
corresponds to “G 1 succeeds” 
l The disjunct 
@a, s2)(st = &?(a, $2) A a < cut(x’)) 
corresponds to “the derivation st of F(2) uses a rule before the cut rule”. 
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l The disjunct 
(3.~2, .Q)(s~ = do(cut(i). $2) A ~3 C sz A f irst-der(GI, ~3)) 
corresponds to “uses this rule with the first derivation of G I”. Notice that we cannot 
replace the above formula by the following more straightforward one: 
(3s2)(sl = do(cut(z), ~2) A f irst-der(GI, ~2)) 
because $2 may not be a minimal plan for G 1. 
In the following, we call sentence (11) the uccessibility constraint corresponding to the 
occurrence of ! in clause cut(i) after the subgoal G 1. Notice that a clause may have more 
than one occurrences of ! , thus generate more than one accessibility constraints. 
Now given a program P, suppose 
Act(s) > ‘&(s). 
are all the accessibility constraints. We call the following sentence the accessibility axiom 
of P: 
Act(s) = ‘& (s) A . . A ‘&k(s). (12) 
Notice that this axiom attempts to define Act recursively since the predicate also occurs 
in the right hand side of the equivalence. This should not be surprising. For example, 
the logical formalization of negation in logic programs normally requires fixed-point 
constructions, and negation is usually implemented by cut. 
Definition 5 (Extended Action Theory). Let P be a program, and A a given set of axioms 
about < on actions. The extended action theory I of P is the the following set: 
E=DUAU(Acc,(lO)}. 
where D is the basic action theory for P, and Act is the accessibility axiom of P of the 
form (12). 
Definition 6. Let P be a program, E its extended action theory, and G a goal. A situation 
term S is an uccessible plan for G iff I + (V,?). Act(S) A H (G, S), where ,? are the 
variables in G and S. 
Now given a query G, we answer it by looking for a constructive proof of the following 
entailment: 
E + (3i. s).Acc(.s) A H(G, s), 
where x’ are the variables in G. Notice that when G contains variables, this method of 
answering queries does not exactly agree with Prolog’s It is well known that in the 
presence of cut, according to most Prolog implementations, a program may answer a query 
like F(u) positively but fail to return x = u as a possible answer when presented with 
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the query F(x). However, this oddity of Prolog does not show up here: x = a will be 
returned as an answer according to our construction because an accessible plan for F(a) is 
a constructive proof of (3x, s) Act(s) A H(F(.u), s). 
We illustrate the definitions with our max example. Suppose we use Prolog’s search 
strategy, and order the actions as: 
A = (a < b = @)a = A1 (2) A (3j)b = AZ(~)}. 
Notice that we do not care about how the rules about leq are ordered. Since the only 
occurrence of ! is in A 1, the accessibility axiom is 
Act(s) = (Vx, y, z)((3s’)(Acc(s’) A H(leq(x, y), s’)) > 
(Vsl)[sl 2 s Aminimal(mux(x, y. z), sj) 3 
(3a, sz)(sl = &(a, s?) A a -C Al@, y, z)) v (13 
(32, S~)(SI = do(A~(x, y. z), 32) A 
sg C: s2 A f irst-der(kq(x, y), Q))]}. 
Now let E be the extended action theory of the program. First of all, we can show that 
E t== (Vx, y. z, s).minimal(leq(x, y), s) > [AC(S) A --H(max(x, y, z), s)], 
thus 
& I= (Vx, y)[(3.y)H(leq(x, Y), 8) = (3s)(Acc(s) A H(leq(x, y), s)>l. 
This is intuitively right since the only appearance of ! is in the definition of mux, and the 
presence of ! has no effect on leq. 
Now let SI =do(Bl(l, 2), SO), and S2 = do(A1(1,2,2), SI). Clearly 
E + H(leq(l,2), Sl) Aminimal(mux(l,2,2). &). 
We claim that E + Acc(S2) so that S2 is an accessible plan for mux( I, 2,2). Notice first 
that 
E k @s).Acc(s) A H(leq(l,2),s), 
I t= (Vx, y, z). H(mux(x, y, z), S2) 3 (x = 1 A y = 2 A z = 2), 
~~~(~~,s).~~=do(U,s)Aa~A~(1,2.2). 
Therefore by ( 13) 
E +Acc(&) = (3s3)(s3 C St A first-der(leq(l,2), ~3)). 
Let ,s3 be SI , then & b Acc(S2) if 
I I= first_der(leq(l,2), Sl), 
that is 
in imal(leq(l,2),s)As<S]. E kminimal(leq(l, 2). sl) A -(3s).Acc(s) Am 
This follows from 
& + (Vs).minimal(leq(l, 2), s) ES = SI. 
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So we have proved that & ‘F Acc(S2). 
On the other hand, there are no accessible plans for max ( 1,2, 1). The proof is as follows. 
Suppose for some situation term S, I + max(l,2, 1, S). Then it must be the case that 
do(A2(1,2, l), So) 5 S. Since 
E + (!ls).Acc(s) A H(leq(l,2), s), 
I + (Vs).minimal(max(l, 2, l), s) 3 s = do(Az(1.2, l), SO), 
it follows from (13) that for Act(S) to hold, it must be the case that 
(3a,s)[do(A2(1, 2, l), So) =do(a,s) AU x Al(1.2, l)] v 
(3s,s’)[do(A2(1,2, l), So) =do(Al(l,2, l),s) AS’ cs A 
first_der(leq(l,2), s’)], 
which is obviously impossible. 
Generalizing the above reasoning, we have: 
I I= (Vx, Y){ (~~)~(k(~, Y), s) AX # Y 3 
[(3s)(Acc(s) A ff(max(x, Y, Y), s)) A 
-(3s)(Acc(s) A H(max(x, y, x), s))]}. 
So the max program indeed defines max correctly. However since 
E F (Vx, y, z)[(3s)N(max(x, y, z), s) = (3s)(A&) A H(max(x, Y, z), s))l, 
this use of cut is not ideal in the sense that it does more than search control, i.e., it is a 
“red” cut. 
5. Stratified programs 
As we have noticed, the accessibility axiom attempts to define Act recursively. A natural 
question then is if the recursion will yield a unique solution for the predicate. In general, the 
answer is negative. However, if a program is properly stratified, then the axiom will yield a 
unique solution. To show this, we first present two simple lemmas about our axiomatization 
of cut. 
The following lemma says that ifs is not a derivation of F, then whether s is accessible 
has nothing to do with rules about F: 
Lemma 1. Let P be a program, and & its extended action theory. Suppose the accessibility 
axiom for P is as (12): 
Act(s) = @, (s) A . . . A ‘@j,(s). 
Let F be a fluent. Without loss generality, let 
(Vs)Acc(s) > *I, . . . , (Vs)Acc(s) > ‘J’k 
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be the accessibility constraints of the form (11) f or all the occurrences of ! in the dejinition 
sf F. Under E, we have: 
-@x^)H(F($, s) > [Act(s) = pk+l A ... A ‘&I. (14) 
Proof. Under E, if a situation is not a derivation for an atom, then no part of it can be a 
derivation: 
-H(F(,?), s) AS’ s s 3 -H(F($, s’). 
Therefore if ly (s) is the right hand side of (1 l), then 
-(X)H(F(,?), s) 3 P(s). 
From this, (14) follows. q 
The following lemma says that if there is an accessible plan for G, then there is a 
accessible minimal plan for G. 
Lemma 2. Let P be a program and E its extended action theory. For any goal G, we have: 
(3s)(Acc(s) A H(G, s)) E @s)(Acc(s) A minimal(G, s)). 
Proof. By induction on situations, if there is a plan for G, then there is a minimal plan for 
it: 
C /= (Vs).H(G,s) > @s’)(s’Cs r\minimal(G.s’)). 
From this and the fact that (Vs, s’)(Acc(s) A s’ E s > Acc(s’)), the lemma follows. o 
Let P be a program, and F a fluent. We say that the definition of F in P is cut-free 
if none of the clauses that are relevant to F contains ! . Here a clause is relevant to F if, 
inductively, either it’s in the definition of F or it’s relevant to another fluent that appears in 
the definition of F. For example, the definition of leq in the max example is cut-free. For 
cut-free fluents, Act does not play a role: 
Proposition 1. Let P be a program, and & its extended action theory. For any goal G, if 
the definition of each fluent F mentioned in G is cut-free, then under & we have: 
minimal(G, s) > Act(s), 
(3s)H(G, s) = (3s)(Acc(s) A H(G, s)). 
Proof. If minimal(G, s), then s cannot be a derivation for any fluent that is not relevant 
to a fluent in G. Since every fluent in G is cut-free, this means that s cannot be a derivation 
for any fluent whose definition contains a rule that mentions cut. From this, the desired 
result follows directly from Lemma 1. III 
Cut-free fluents are the ground case of stratified programs: 
Definition 7. A program P is strati$ed if there is a function f from fluents in P to natural 
numbers such that 
(1) If F is cut-free in P, then f(F) = 0. 
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(2) If F is not cut-free, then f(F) is 
1 + max( f( F’) ( F’ appears in the definition of F}. 
It is clear that if P is stratified, then for any fluent F in P, f(F) is uniquely determined 
by the above two rules. In such case, we shall call the uniquely determined number the rank 
of F in P, and the maximum of the ranks of all the fluents in P the rank of the program 
P. For instance, in our max example, the rank of leq is 0, and the rank of mux is 1. So the 
rank of the program is 1, 
We now show that if P is stratified, then its accessibility axiom can be written equiv- 
alently in a recursion-free form. To that end, we introduce a new set of unary predicates 
Acco, Acct , . . . , Accn , . . . . Intuitively, Accn (s) holds if s is accessible (reachable) when all 
rules that mention a fluent of rank > n are deleted from P. Formally, they are defined as 
follows: 
Acco(s) z frue. 
For 12 > 0, suppose 
(15) 
CUtl(x; ) : Fl(x;) :- Gl&!&G;. 
a& (A$) : Fk(x;) : - Gk&! &G;,. 
are all of the occurrences of ! in the definitions of the fluents of rank rz. Then Accn is 
defined by the following axiom: 
Act,(s) rAcc,_l(s) A @l(s) A ... A @k(s), 
where for any 1 < i < k, @i(s) is obtained as follows: suppose 
(16) 
(Vs).Acc(s) > pi(s) 
is the accessibility constraint of the form (11) for the occurrence of ! in the rule CUQ (X;.), 
then @i(s) is the result of replacing every occurrence of Act in pi(s) by Accn_l . 
Now the axiom (16) defines Accn inductively since its right hand mentions only Act+ 1. 
We have: 
Theorem 2. Let P be a strutijed program, M its rank, and E its corresponding extended 
action theory. We have 
E b Act(s) = AccM (s) 
Proof. We prove by induction that for any goal G that mentions only fluents of rank < i, 
we have 
(3s)[Acc(s) A H(G, s)] = @s)[Acci(s) A H(G, s)]. (17) 
For i = 0, this follows from Proposition 1. Inductively, suppose that this holds for i We 
show that it holds for i + 1 as well. 
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By Lemma 2, 
(3s)[Acc(s) A H(G, s)] = (3s)[Acc(s) r\minimal(G, s)]. 
Let 
(Vs)(Acc(s) > ‘PI(S)), . ., (Vs)(Acc(s) > ‘P,~(s)) 
be all of the accessibility constraints for the occurrences of ! in the definitions of fluents 
of rank < IZ + 1. By Lemma 1 and the fact that if minimal(G, s), then s cannot be a 
derivation for any fluents of rank > n + 1, we have 
(3s)[Acc(s) r\minimal(G, s)] z 
(L)[@l(,l(s) A ... A qm(s) r\minimal(G,s)]. 
According to the way that @I(S). . . . @,n (s) are obtained from P/(s), . . . , W/y,(s), respec- 
tively, by inductive assumption, we have 
@s)[P~(.s) A ... A Pm(s) r\minimal(G,s)] = 
(%)[@/(.F) A ..’ A QrTl (s) A minimal(G, s)]. 
But by the definition of Acc,+l (s), 
Acc,+~ (s) = @l(s) A . . A &, (s). 
Therefore (17) holds for i + 1 as well. This completes our inductive proof, and thus the 
proof that (17) holds for all i. From (17) the theorem follows immediately. q 
6. Negation-as-failure by cut 
In last section we showed that for stratified programs, our axiom for Act yields a 
unique solution. As can be expected, this does not hold in general. Consider the following 
program: 
t-1 : p :- q’. 
Y2 : q :- P’. 
4 : P’ :- p & ! & fail. 
rd : P' . 
us : q’ :- q & ! & fail. 
r6 : CT’ . 
Notice that the definition off% is empty, so (Vs)lH (fail, s). This program is clearly not 
stratified. Its accessibility axiom is: 
288 F: Lin /Arrijicial Intelligence 103 (1998) 273-294 
Act(s) c 
(3s’>(Acc(s’) A H(p, s’)) > 
(Vsl)[sl Cs Aminimal(p',sl)> 
(3a,s2)(sl =do(a,s2) Aa -c ~3) V 
(3.~2, sg)(sl = do(r3, $2) As3 C s2 A f irst-der(p, sg))] A 
(b’)(Acc(s’) A H(q, s’)) > 
(Vsl)[sl C s Aminimal(q',sl)> 
(3a,s2)(sl = do(a,~2)Au -x rs) V 
(3~2, s3)(s1 = do(rs, ~2) A s3 C s2 A f irst-der(q, sg))]. 
Since r4 is the only rule by which p’ can be established, we have: 
minimal(p',s) 3 s = do(r4,So). 
Similarly, (Vs)[minimal(q',s) > s = dO(rg,$)]. Thus if we assume the following 
ordering on the rules: 
A = ((Va, b)[a -c b z (a = t-g A b = r4) v (a = rg A b = rg)]), 
then we have 
Act(s) = [H(p’, s) 3 -(3s’)(Acc(s’) A H(p, s’))] A 
[H(q’, s) > -(3s’)(Acc(s’) A H(q, s’))]. 
Let & be the extended action theory of this program, we then have 
E + (3s)(Acc(s) A ff(p, s)) A +s)(Acc(s) A ff(q, s)) V 
(3s)(Acc(s) A ff(q, ~1) A +s)@cc(s) A ff(p, s)), 
that is, there is an accessible plan for p iff there is not an accessible plan for q, and the 
other way around as well. 
Notice that the program is a rendition of the following logic program: 
p :- notq. 
9 :- notp. 
withnegationimplementedby cutas: 
not F :- F & ! & fail. 
notF. 
If we identify an answer set (Gelfond and Lifschitz [3]) with a set of atoms that have 
accessible derivations, then for this program, our semantics agrees with that of [3]. Our 
following theorem shows that this equivalence holds for arbitrary normal programs as well. 
Let P be a logic program with negation (not) but without cut. Suppose that for each 
fluent F in P, F’ is a new fluent of the same arity. Let P’ be the logic program obtained 
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by replacing every literal of the form not F(z) in P by F’(f), and by adding, for each new 
fluent F’, the following two clauses: 
AF(;) : F’(2) : - F(i) & ! & fail. 
A;(X) : F’(g). 
Suppose that for each fluent F, the action AF is ordered before the action A>. 
Theorem 3. Let & be the extended action theory of PI, and V the action theory for P as 
defined in (Lin and Reiter [7]). For any$uent F in P, and any tuple i of terms, we have: 
(1) If M is a model of D, then there is a model M’ of & such that M /= (3s) H (F(y), s) 
ifsM’ b (S).Acc(s) A H(F(i), s). 
(2) If M’ is a model of E, then there is a model M’ of 2) such that M + (3s) H(F(i), s) 
ifsM + (3s).Acc(s) A H(F(i), s). 
Proof. The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix A because it is relatively long, and 
needs some results from [7]. q 
From this theorem, we conclude that the usual implementation of negation using cut is 
correct with respect to the semantics given in (Lin and Reiter [7]). As noted in (Lin and 
Reiter [7]), the semantics given there for logic programs with negation yields the same 
results as that given in (Wallace [ 12]), and the latter has been shown to be equivalent to 
the stable model semantics of (Gelfond and Lifschitz [3]) when only Herbrand models are 
considered. Therefore we can also conclude that the usual implementation of negation in 
terms of cut is correct with respect to the stable model semantics for logic programs with 
negation in the propositional case: 
Corollary 4. Let P be a propositional logic program with negation but without cut. Let 
P’ be the logic program obtained from P as described above. For any set W of atoms, 
W is an answer set of P according to Gelfond and Lifschitz ifs there is a model M of the 
extended action theory of P' such that W = (p / M + (b).Acc(s) A H(p, s)). 
7. Concluding remarks 
We have applied the situation calculus to logic programming by giving a semantics to 
programs with cut. We have shown that this semantics has some desirable properties: it is 
well-behaved when the program is stratified, and that according to this semantics, the usual 
implementation of negation-as-failure operator by cut is provably correct with respect to 
Gelfond and Lifschitz’s stable model semantics. 
There has been relatively few formal work on cut compared to that on negation in logic 
programming. Previous work on the semantics of cut includes an operational semantics 
by Podelski and Smolka [9], a denotational semantics by Jones and Mycroft [5], a 
dynamic algebra semantics by Borger [2], a paralogical semantics by Andrews [l] and 
a simple completion-style semantics by Stroetmann and Glal3 [ 111 for a very special class 
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of programs. Comparisons among these different semantics and between our semantics 
and the others have been difficult for two reasons: most of the semantics have been 
mathematically quite involved, and the formalisms used are very different. However, as 
part of our future work, we shall attempt to show that our semantics and the one given by 
Stroetmann and Glal3 are equivalent for the special class of programs that they considered. 
More importantly, we shall try to use this semantics to clarify the proper roles of cut in 
logic programming, and to study the possibility of a better control mechanism in logic 
programming. 
Our long term goal is to use the situation calculus as a general framework for 
representing and reasoning about control and strategic information in problem solving. In 
this regard, we have made some preliminary progress in applying the situation calculus to 
formalizing control knowledge in planning. As we mentioned in Section 1, in AI planning, 
a plan is a sequence of actions, thus isomorphic to situations. So control knowledge in 
planning, which often are constraints on desirable plans, becomes constraints on situations, 
Based on this idea, in (Lin [6]), we formulate precisely a subgoal ordering in planning 
in the situation calculus, and show how information about this subgoal ordering can be 
deduced from a background action theory, and, for both linear and nonlinear planners, how 
knowledge about this ordering can be used in a provably correct way to avoid unnecessary 
backtracking. We believe other control knowledge in planning can be similarly axiomatized 
and made into good use as well. 
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Appendix A 
This appendix proves Theorem 3. Recall that in this theorem, P is a logic program with 
negation but without cut, and P’ is the logic program obtained by replacing every literal of 
the form not F(f) in P by F’(T), and by adding, for each new fluent F’, the following 
two clauses: 
A&) : F’(i) : - F(i) & ! SC fail. 
A’&) : F’(i) . 
We also assume that for each fluent F, the action A ,G is ordered before the action A>. 
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In Section 3, we review the action theory semantics of [7] for logic programs without 
negation. Action theories for programs with negation have the same form but with the 
following semantics for negation: H(not p, s) is -(3s’)H(p, s). Notice that H(not p, s) 
is in fact independent of the situation argument. For example, given the following clauses: 
rt(x): p(x) :- notq(x) 
r2(x): p(x) :- x=u 
the successor state axiom for F is: 
H@(x), do(u, s)) = a = r)(x) A H(not q(x), s) V 
(a = q(x) Ax = u) v H(p(x), s). 
Theorem 3. Let E be the extended action theory of P’, and 2) the action theoryfor P as 
defined in (Lin and Reiter [7]). For any fluent F in P, and any tuple i of terms of sort 
object, we have: 
(1) IfMisamodelofD, thenthereisamodelM’of&suchthatM~((3s)H(F(i),s) 
ifsM’ + (S).Acc(s) A H(F(?), s). 
(2) If M’ is a model of I, then there is a model M’ of V such that M b (3s) H (F (ii, s) 
ifsM’ /= @s).Acc(s) A H(F(i), s). 
Proof. Suppose that F;, . . . , FL are the new fluents in P’. Observe first that, as for the 
example in Section 6, we can show that 
I k Act(s) = (A.]) 
(Vx;)(H(F;(x;,s) >-(%‘)[Acc(s’)A H(F,(x;),s’)]}r\...r\ 
(V.a${H(F;(.$), s) > -(L’)[Acc(s’) A H(Fk(x$. s’)]). 
Suppose now that M is a model of V. Construct an interpretation M’ as follows: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
The domain of M’ for sort object is the same as that in M. 
The domain of M’ for sort action is the union of the action domain of M and the 
following set: 
(A r, (d), A>[ (2) 1 1 < i < k, d’ is a tuple of elements in the object domain). 
The truth values of fluents are always false in SO, and computed according to the 
successor state axioms of E in successor situations. 
The interpretation for Act is defined as follows: For any s^ in the situation domain of 
I 6 M, 
iff for any I < i < k and any tuple ii of elements in the object domain, whenever 
M’ + H(F:(tTi). s^) 
6 To simplify our presentation, if u is an element in the domain of a model M and q(x) is a formula, then we’ll 
use M + q(u) to stand for M, o + q(n), where o is a variable assignment such that (T(X) = u. 
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then 
M + 1(3S’)fi(LZi, S’). 
We need to show that M’ is a model of E, and that for any fluent F and any tuple ii of 
objects, 
M I= &)H(F($, s) 
* (A.2) 
M’ /= (3s)Acc(s) A H(F($, s) 
By the construction of M’, the fact that M’ is a model of & follows directly from (A. 1) and 
the equivalence (A.2). We now prove the equivalence. Suppose 
M I= (b)H(F($, s). 
Then for some s^ in the situation domain of M, M k minimal( F(G), .F). By induction 
on situations, for some actions at, . . , a,, s^ = &([a], . . , a,], SO). Because none of the 
fluents are true in the initial situation SO, by the form of the successor state axioms in 27, ai 
must be the action name for some of the rules in P, for each 1 < i < II. Furthermore, since 
Jn is a minimal plan for F(i), for each i, the body of ai must be satisfied in the situation 
do([al, . .ai_t]. So). Now suppose 
not 4, (~7,)~. . . , not fi,(6,,,) 
are the negative literals appearing in the rules corresponding to a I, . . . , a,. Then let s^’ be 
the situation that uses first the rules A> for the new fluents corresponding to the above 
literals, then the rules in s: 
s^’ = do(]Ak,, (~7, ), . . , A>,,n (~7~1, al, . , anl, So). (A.3) 
By the construction of M’, it can be verified that s^’ is in the situation domain of M’, and 
M’ +Acc(i’) A H(F(;), i’). 
Conversely, suppose 
M’ + (b)Acc(s) A H(F(Li), s). 
Then there are al, . . , a, in the action domain of M’ such that 
M’ bAcc(do([aI, . , a,], So)) A minimal(F(G), &([a],. . . , a,], So)). 
Because we don’t have any rules about fail, this means that ai’s cannot be Aq(U) for 
any 1 < 1 <k. If ai is A>,(;), then F,‘(G) must be true in do([al,...,a,l,So). Since 
this situation is accessible in M’, by the construction of M’, M + -(b)H(F($, s). 
This means that if c = [al,, . . , al,,,] is the list resulted from deleting the actions of 
the form A;,(d) in [at,. . , a,], then do(<, SO) is a situation in the domain of M, and 
M + H(F($, do(c, SO)). This proves the equivalence (A.2) and the first half of the 
theorem. 
To prove the second half of the theorem, suppose now that M’ is a model of E. Construct 
an interpretation M as follows: 
(1) M and M’ share the domains for all sorts. 
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(2) The truth values of fluents are defined as follows: Initially, all fluents are false: 
M b (V,+F(2, So) 
for every fluent F. Inductively, for any s^ in the situation domain, any action ri in 
the action domain, and any tuple ii of objects, the truth value of F(a) in do(i. .?) is 
defined by the following two cases: 
Case 1. 6 is not an action that corresponds to one of clauses in the definition of F 
in P. In this case, 
M + H(F(ii), du(ii, i)) 
iff 
M + H(F(i), ;). 
Case 2. 6 is an action that corresponds to one of the clauses in the definition of F 
in P. To simplify our presentation, suppose the instantiation of this clause is 
F(.ii) : - G & not Fi(f). 
where G does not contain not . Then 
M b H(F(ii), &I(& i)) 
iff 
M b H(G, St), 
and 
M’ I= -(3s’).Acc(s’) A H(Fi(;). s’). 
Again, we need to show that the equivalence (A.2) holds, and that M is a model of D. i.e., 
satisfies the successor state axioms in V. 
The proof of the equivalence (A.2) is similar to the one given above: 
(1) if M b (3s)H(F($, s), then there is a situation s^ such that 
M + minimal(F($,ct). 
Let i’ be the situation obtained from s^ in the way described by (A.3). Then from the 
construction of M and (A.l), it can be verified that M’ bAcc(?) A H(F(ii), i’). 
(2) if M’ + (3s)Acc(s) A H(F(ii), s), then there is a s^ in the situation domain such 
that M’ + Acc(s”) A minimal(F($, i). Let s^' be the situation obtained from s^ by 
eliminating actions that do not correspond to actions in P. Then M ‘F H (F (ii). .?I). 
From the equivalence (A.2), we have that for any fluent F, 
M’ + (b).Acc(s) A H(F’(i), s) 
iff 
A4 b -@s)H(F(ii), s). 
From this, it is easy to show that M satisfies the successor state axioms in 2). q 
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